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ABSTRACT
Access control is an important part of security that restricts
the actions that users can perform on resources. Policy
models specify how these restrictions are formulated in poli-
cies. Over the last decades, we have seen several such mod-
els, including role-based access control and more recently,
attribute-based access control. However, these models do
not take into account the relationships between users, re-
sources and entities and their corresponding properties. This
limits the expressiveness of these models. In this work, we
present Entity-Based Access Control (EBAC). EBAC intro-
duces entities as a primary concept and takes into account
both attributes and relationships to evaluate policies. In ad-
dition, we present Auctoritas. Auctoritas is a authorization
system that provides a practical policy language and evalua-
tion engine for EBAC. We find that EBAC increases the ex-
pressiveness of policies and fits the application domain well.
Moreover, our evaluation shows that entity-based policies
described in Auctoritas can be enforced with a low policy
evaluation latency.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.4.6 [Security and Protection]: Access controls
General Terms
Management, Security, Languages
Keywords
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1. INTRODUCTION
Access control is an important security measure that lim-
its the actions that a user (typically referred to as the sub-
ject) can perform on resources, which are referred to as ob-
jects. This can typically be specified in externalized policies.
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Over the last decades, several access control models have
been introduced to increase the expressiveness of these poli-
cies. One important such model is Attribute-Based Access
Control (ABAC, [13, 24]). ABAC determines access based
on attributes. Attributes are key-value pairs which are as-
signed to subjects, objects, actions and the environment.
These attributes can then be compared with each other and
literal values in order to determine if access is permitted.
Such comparisons can also be combined into rules using log-
ical connectives (i.e., and, or, not). As such, ABAC supports
expressive policies.
However, a limitation of ABAC is that it cannot easily
reflect relationships. This is evident in the following rule:
“A physician can view medical records that correspond
to consultations for which the treating physician is of
the same hospital, and corresponding to a patient
that is also enrolled to the same hospital.”
(A)
This rule implicitly evaluates the relationship of physi-
cians with a patient’s health record, and its translation to
ABAC involves attributes such as“object.consultation physi-
cian affiliation”and“object.consultation patient enrollments”.
Such synthetic attributes implicitly reflect the relationship
that the object has with concepts in the application domain.
Obtaining values for these attributes from the underlying
data model requires specification of complex queries by a se-
curity expert. This may require considerable effort. Worse,
some rules even force such queries to (partially) reflect the
access control logic. For example, consider the rule:
“A physician can view a medical record of a patient
if that physician had a consultation with that patient
in the last year”
(B)
Here, the consultations in the last year could be repre-
sented by an attribute subject.consultation patients last year.
This attribute, however, already reflects rule (B). This in-
troduces several disadvantages. First, it reduces readability
of the policy. Second, it requires both the query as well as
the policy to be modified whenever the rule changes (e.g., if
consultations of the last two years are permitted). Third,
since the query is specified in-code, modification of a pol-
icy may also require recompilation and redeployment of the
application. This is a problem for applications that require
continuous uptime, e.g., web applications.
In this paper, we introduce Entity-Based Access Con-
trol (EBAC). EBAC introduces the concept of entities as
a first-class citizen in access control policies. Entities can
have both attributes and relationships, which are addressed
as key-value pairs. Similar to ABAC, EBAC compares at-
Figure 1: Physicians manage medical records. Patients are
not primary actors of the application.
tributes with each other in order to make an access decision.
However, EBAC policies can also navigate relationships and
compare the attributes of related entities. Comparisons can
be composed into complex expressions by means of logical
connectives or predicate logic functions that can reason over
relationships. Moreover, EBAC supports evaluation based
on relationship paths of arbitrary length between entities
and can reason about the entities along these paths. As
a result, EBAC supports a more expressive way to reason
about the application domain.
This paper introduces a policy model for EBAC. More-
over, it introduces Auctoritas, an authorization system that
supports EBAC. Auctoritas includes a policy language and a
policy evaluation engine. We evaluate what can be expressed
in Auctoritas with regard to XACML and analyze the pol-
icy evaluation performance. We find that EBAC offers a
more expressive model to specify policies in as compared to
ABAC, and that Auctoritas policies can be enforced with
low latency overhead.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion 2 analyses the problem in more detail. Section 3 elab-
orates on a EBAC policy model. Section 4 describes Auc-
toritas, an authorization system that supports EBAC. Sec-
tion 5 evaluates the expressiveness of the Auctoritas policy
language and the performance of its evaluation engine. Sec-
tion 6 describes related work. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. PROBLEM ANALYSIS
This section elaborates on the problem of limited expres-
siveness of ABAC in more detail. EBAC is motivated by
rules that we encountered in case studies of electronic doc-
ument processing [6], e-workforce management [7] and e-
Health applications. For illustrative purposes, we focus on
an example of an e-Health application that will be used
throughout the paper. However, we do intend EBAC to
be applicable to a wide range of applications.
2.1 Illustrative scenario
Consider an e-Health application that manages the medi-
cal records of patients for multiple health care facilities. The
application enables physicians across health care facilities to
look up and manage medical records for patients who par-
ticipate in the system. Figure 1 illustrates the application.
From an access control perspective, medical records are
the objects of the application. Medical records indicate the
results of medical treatments and the actions that were per-
formed during a consultation. Multiple medical records can
be added for a single consultation. Patients can be enrolled
1. A trainee physician can not create medical records.
2. A physician can view a medical record if the patient
has granted his/her explicit consent to do so.
3. A physician can view a medical record if he/she is
supervisor of the physician that created the record.
4. A physician can view a medical record if the corre-
sponding patient had a consultation with him/her
in the last year.
5. A physician can create a medical record if the cat-
egories he/she assigns to the record are all special-
izations of the physician.
6. A physician can create the medical record of a pa-
tient if that patient is enrolled to the same facility
with which that physician is affiliated.
7. A physician can view a medical record if it cor-
responds to consultations for which the involved
physician is from the same facility, and corresponds
to a patient that is also enrolled to the same facility.
8. A trainee physician cannot view a medical record
if it corresponds to consultations that took place
more than four years before the trainee started.
9. A physician can view a medical record if the patient
of its corresponding consultation already had a con-
sultation with the physician’s (in)direct supervisor.
Table 1: Example set of access control rules for a specific
hospital that uses the application
to a health care facility to make this information available
to all of its physicians.
Physicians are the primary users of the application. They
are affiliated with a health care facility and have multiple
specializations. They create and view medical records.
However, this needs to be constrained by access policies.
Typically, health care facilities want to restrict access ac-
cording to their own internal structure and requirements.
Table 1 provides a set of rules that regulate access of physi-
cians for the application from the case study. Evidently, this
listing is meant to be illustrative and is not exhaustive. In
the remainder of this section, we argue why most of these
rules are too complex to express in ABAC. The next sections
describe and illustrate how EBAC is able to express this.
2.2 Supporting technologies
Access control constraints are described in policies. Such
policies can be separated from the application about which
they reason, a technique commonly referred to as policy-
based access control [20]. Externalizing policies from the
application code offers several benefits. First, it enables sep-
aration of concerns between security experts and application
developers. Second, it increases the modularity of both ap-
plication code and security policies. Third, it supports pol-
icy adaptation without requiring application redeployment.
Policies adhere to a certain access control model. A pop-
ular access control model is Attribute-Based Access Control
(ABAC, [13, 24]). ABAC determines access by means of
attributes. These attributes are represented as key-value
pairs that are assigned to subjects, objects, actions and the
environment. Whenever a subject attempts to access an ob-
ject, a policy assessing the attributes of the subject, object,
action and environment is evaluated.
Due to its widespread use, XACML [17] has become the de
facto standard for specifying policies in ABAC. In XACML,
attribute-based policies are structured as trees that contain
a non-empty, ordered lists of rules1. Rules reason about ac-
cess by means of logical expressions. They consist of a tar-
get, condition and an effect (i.e., permit or deny). Both tar-
get and condition are described by means of logical expres-
sions that perform comparisons of attributes to each other
or to concrete values. Expressions may also consist of logical
connectives such as conjunction, disjunction and negation.
If both target and condition evaluate to true, the rule evalu-
ates to the specified effect. Otherwise, the rule is not appli-
cable and does not influence the final access control decision.
Policies also specify a target. If the target expression eval-
uates to true, the policy is further evaluated. Combination
algorithms resolve conflicts that may arise whenever rules of
a policy evaluate to different results. Common combination
algorithms include first applicable (in which the first ap-
plicable rule dictates the outcome), permit overrides (in
which a single permit decision overrides any other outcome)
and deny overrides.
2.3 Problem elaboration
The state of the art supports the specification of expres-
sive policies. However, not all rules of Table 1 can be ex-
pressed by current technologies. This is limited by what
ABAC can specify.
One of the important drawbacks of ABAC is that it does
not always apply seamlessly to the application domain about
which it is supposed to reason. This is due to the fact that
it only focuses on attributes that are assigned to either the
subject, object, action or environment in its access rules.
Moreover, ABAC does not properly support the expression
of relationships. For example, an attribute that identifies
the hospital of the physician that has created a medical
record can be modeled as “object.consultation physician -
affiliation id”. This requires the specification of a custom
query to retrieve the values that correspond to this attribute,
and involves manual mapping of attributes onto the data
model by the security expert.
Such mapping is also an issue when translating complex
relationships. For example, consider rule 9 from Table 1. A
supervisor can be the direct supervisor of the subject, which
can be modeled as the attribute“subject.supervisor id”. How-
ever, an indirect supervisor cannot be represented in this
way, and requires workarounds such as modeling an attribute
“subject.supervisor ids” which holds a set of all (in)direct su-
pervisors of the subject. In order to accommodate such an
attribute in the policy, the security expert needs to map
a recursive relationship between physicians onto the data
model. This can only be realized by means of a method
which retrieves all indirect supervisors recursively.
Similarly, ABAC also does not support the specification
of rules that reason about multiple attributes that are ad-
dressed over a relationship. For example, consider rule 4
1For brevity and because of its similarity to policies, we
disregard policy sets for the description of XACML.
from Table 1. This rule could be described using an at-
tribute such as “subject.record ids of last year”, which re-
turns all identifiers corresponding to consultations that the
subject was involved in during the last year. However, a
query to retrieve the values for this attribute at least par-
tially reasons about the rule itself. This is clear when we
want to change the rule to permit access to any medical
records corresponding to consultations in the last two years.
This would involve a modification of both the query as well
as the attribute that is referred to in the access control pol-
icy. Moreover, such an attribute reduces the readability of
the policy, and may require recompilation and redeployment
of the application when the rule is modified.
As a result, ABAC lacks expressiveness as it does not
support reasoning over relationships with entities other than
subjects, objects and actions. This can become a problem
when specifying complex rules over an application domain.
3. ENTITY-BASED ACCESS CONTROL
In order to cope with the drawbacks of ABAC, we present
Entity-Based Access Control (EBAC). EBAC generalizes
ABAC by introducing an entity-relationship model into the
policy expressions. These expressions reason about relation-
ships between entities next to supporting comparisons of en-
tity attributes. EBAC integrates two core concepts:
ER model. The entity-relationship model (ER-model, [3])
is a data model for representing data of, among others,
application domains. The ER-model combines three
components: entities, their properties and inter-entity
relationships. Properties assigned to entities are simi-
lar to the attributes of ABAC.
Logical expressions. Like XACML [17], EBAC supports
policy assessments by means of evaluating logical ex-
pressions that compose rule conditions. These expres-
sions compare properties with each other and with con-
crete values and can be combined by means of logical
connectives (e.g., and, or, not). Additionally, EBAC
supports predicate logic functions ∀ and ∃ and extends
them to reason about relationships.
Note that EBAC also relates to the Relationship-Based
Access Control (ReBAC, [12]) model. ReBAC is an access
control model that focuses on privacy of end users in on-
line social networks. To do so, ReBAC takes into account
relationships between end users to determine access control
decisions. However, it does not (or only limitedly [12]) sup-
port reasoning about properties of these end users and their
relationships. This can be especially problematic when the
policy needs to restrict access based on the values of cer-
tain properties (e.g., temporal attributes). Moreover, most
ReBAC models do not take into account entities other than
subjects and objects to specify the access control restric-
tions. Therefore, conceptually, this paper generalizes both
ABAC and ReBAC into EBAC.
The remainder of this section introduces EBAC. First, it
specifies how entities, attributes and relationships are mod-
eled. Next, it elaborates on how expressions are represented.
3.1 Entity model and instantiation
In order to specify expressions, an entity model must exist
that describes what can be compared in these expressions.
EBAC supports comparison of entity attributes and reasons
about relationships between entities.
Figure 2: Entity model. For brevity, we omit action and environment entities, and relationship arities are not shown explicitly.
Instead, a ∗ indicates a minimum arity of 0 and unbounded maximum. Otherwise, the relationship type occurs exactly once.
An entity model defines all types of entities, their at-
tributes and the types of relationships that can exist be-
tween any two entity types for a certain application. This
corresponds to the ER-model, which supports entity sets,
their corresponding properties and relations to be speci-
fied [3]. Similar to relationship-based models [4], this takes
into account entity types and their corresponding relation-
ships. However, an entity model also takes into account
attributes for the entity types and constrains the type and
arity of both attributes and relationships. As a consequence,
it enables the policy to correspond to the application domain
because it can take into account any number of relationships
and properties of any type for each relevant entity type.
An entity model constrains all expressions that can be
specified in the policy for an application. In particular, it
defines the entity types, their attributes and relationship
types that can be specified in policy expressions. Moreover,
it specifies data types so that restrictions can be imposed
on comparisons between any two attributes. We define R as
a finite set of restrictions that are imposed on relationships
between two entity types. Such restrictions formalize the
minimum and maximum number of relationships of a cer-
tain relationship type that are present in the instantiation
of the entity model.
Entity graph. Entity and relationship types can be rep-
resented in a directed, multi-labeled graph G(V,E) in which
its vertices represent entity types and the edges represent
relationship types. This is illustrated in an example entity
model in Figure 2. This model is based on the illustrative
example. Similar to [4], edges of G are labeled, supporting
any relationship type between two types of entities. How-
ever, EBAC also supports multiple labels to be assigned to
vertices in G. Consider L the set of all labels assigned to
vertices v ∈ V . Set L contains tuples (v, k, t), in which
• Element v ∈ V is the vertex to which the label is as-
signed.
• Element k represents a reference to the attribute.
• Element t ∈ T identifies the data type of the attribute.
We define T the set of all supported data types.
An entity model S = (G(V,E), L, T, R) specifies the en-
tities that can be evaluated in the expressions of a policy,
together with their attributes and relationships. For the
entity model represented in Figure 2, the set of labels L in-
cludes the attributes (e.g., startDate), the set of types T in-
cludes the supported data types (e.g., Category) and the set
Figure 3: Example of an instantiation of the entity model
that is illustrated in Figure 2.
R includes restrictions such as that the affiliation relation-
ship is present precisely once for each physician. Informally,
each entity type is identified by a set of outgoing edges of
its corresponding vertex, their accompanying labels, and the
attributes corresponding to the entity.
Instantiation. In order to evaluate a policy, values need
to be retrieved from attributes of the relevant entities. The
entities which are actually present for an application can
be represented as an instantiation of the entity model. An
example of such an instantiation is illustrated in Figure 3.
An instantiation GI(VI , EI) reflects all instances of each en-
tity type and their intermediate relationships. Also, the
attributes (v, k, t) of the entity types are instantiated as
tuples (iv, k, val) in which:
• An entity iv ∈ VI that corresponds to an entity type
bound to a vertex v ∈ V from the entity model.
• A key k that corresponds to the attribute in the model.
• A concrete value val of type t ∈ T that was assigned
to the attribute for this instance.
The model instantiation allows us to evaluate an access
control policy for concrete entities. While such policies are
specified in terms of the entity model, the evaluation deals
with a concrete instantiation that takes into account the
entities related to the relevant subject, object, action and
environment over the pre-defined model.
3.2 Expressions
Expressions enable EBAC rules to support comparisons
between attributes and values. Expressions only evaluate
to true or false. EBAC supports three types of expres-
sions: (1) simple expressions, which express a comparison
between two attributes; (2) composed expressions, which
combine expressions with logical connectives (i.e., and, or,
not); and (3) quantifier expressions, which introduce quanti-
fier functions that reason about properties and relationship
paths of arbitrary length. In order to address attributes in
these expressions, we specify path selectors.
Path selectors
Access requests involve a subject, object, action and context
in which it is performed (represented by the environment).
Consequently, to retrieve attributes, they must be addressed
starting from one of these four entities. However, as opposed
to ABAC, EBAC supports traversing relationships of arbi-
trary length using path selectors.
Informally, a path selector refers to an attribute by spec-
ification of a path of relationship types, ending with an at-
tribute of the final entity. For example, ‘object.consulta-
tion.patient.id’ refers to the identifier that corresponds to
the patient of the consultation to which the object relates.
More formally, consider S a finite set of instances of en-
tities of a type in {subject, object, action, environment}. A
path selector is a tuple (s, P, k) in which
• The entity instance s ∈ S is the starting node from
which the path is traversed.
• A finite, ordered list P = (p1, p2, ..., pn) contains the
path of relationship types (each occurring exactly once)
that is traversed to refer to the attribute. The elements
must match the edge labels in the given order.
• The key of the attribute k that is queried from the
addressed instance at the end of the path P.
For example, a path selector that is informally specified as
‘object.consultation.patient.id’ is represented by (medrec1,
(consultation, patient), id) for a medical record medrec1.
Path selectors enable specification of attribute queries span-
ning over relationship paths. While we refer to attributes in
the remainder of this paper, they are always referred by
means of path selectors.
Simple Expressions
Simple expressions are the basic components of any com-
posed expression. Informally, they compare two attributes
or an attribute and a literal value. For example, consider:
‘neurology’ in object.consultation.physician.specialization
This expression compares a concrete value (i.e., ‘neurol-
ogy’ ) to a set of specialization values.
More formally, simple expressions are tuples (l, r, ) which:
• Elements l and r indicate the left and right leg of the
comparison, respectively. The left leg is always an at-
tribute, whereas the right leg can be either a literal
value or an attribute. Note that attributes are speci-
fied by means of a path selector.
• Comparison operator  (e.g., 6, =) indicates the com-
parison that will be performed between the elements.
Both l and r should be of the same type t ∈ T , or, al-
ternatively,  is an operator that can handle a comparison
between two elements of different types (e.g., a list type sup-
ports the comparison operator in).
The aforementioned expression is modeled as tuple:
((object, (consultation, physician), specialization),
‘neurology’, in)
(a) Horizontal (b) Vertical
Figure 4: Evaluation of quantifier expressions. Note that
horizontal expressions can also reason about multi-valued
attributes, not depicted here.
In this example, the in comparison operator checks whether
the category ‘neurology’ is present in a list of categories that
is retrieved by looking up the attribute for path selector ”ob-
ject.consultation.physician.specialization”.
Compound Expressions
Simple expressions can be combined using logical connec-
tives into composed expressions. For example, consider:
subject.trainee ∧ object.consultation.date 6 env.now
This expression composes two simple expressions by means
of a logical connective. A composed expression is either ex-
pression ¬expr1 or a tuple (expr1, expr2, conn) with
• Both expr1 and expr2 expressions.
• A logical connector conn ∈ {∧,∨}.
Note that expr1 and expr2 can both be any type of expres-
sion. This supports composition of complex expressions.
Quantifier Expressions
Besides simple and compound expressions, EBAC also sup-
ports expressions that can reason about entities addressed
by relationships. Two such expressions exist: horizontal and
vertical quantifier expressions, as illustrated in Figure 4.
Horizontal quantifier expressions. Entity types can
specify relationships that occur more than once. For exam-
ple, a patient can designate an explicit consent to multiple
physicians to view his/her medical records. Similarly, enti-
ties may have attributes with multiple values. For example,
physicians can be assigned multiple specializations.
EBAC supports quantifiers to reason about entities that
are addressed in these relationships. For example, consider
rule 5 of Table 1. This rule includes the following condition:
∀ cat ∈ object.categories : cat ∈ subject.specialization
The rule reasons about a set of categories, and determines
membership in “subject.specialization” for each value.
Similarly, EBAC supports reasoning about entities that
are addressed with a relationship path with an arity higher
than one. Consider rule 4 from Table 1. This rule essentially
reasons about consultations and includes the condition:
∃ cons ∈ object.consultation.patient.consultations :
cons.physician == subject ∧ cons.date < (env.now − 1 year)
The above rule traverses the relationship path “consulta-
tion.patient.consultations” of the object and reasons about
every entity that is addressed via this path.
In order to support this, EBAC makes use of partial ex-
pressions that are referred to inside the quantifier (∀ or ∃).
Partial expressions are expressions that contain anonymous
path selectors. Recall that normally, each path selector by
which an attribute is selected includes a starting node. Such
a starting node is an element of the set S (the set of all in-
stances of entity types that represent a subject, object, action
or environment). Contrarily, anonymous path selectors can
have any instance as starting node. This enables partial ex-
pressions to be parameterized by combining the anonymous
path selector with a path that starts from an element iv ∈ S.
For example, the partial expression in the aforementioned
rule is “cons.physician == subject ∧ cons.date < (env.now−
1 year)′′. Because path selectors have a path starting at
a subject, object, action or environment entity, the entity
“cons” is an anonymous path selector. In order to reference
attributes, they must be parameterized by every entity ad-
dressed by “object.consultation.patient.consultations”. This
supports reasoning about entities using quantifiers.
More formally, we define horizontal quantifier expressions
as tuples (attr, pexpr, f ∈ { ∀, ∃ }) in which
• The element attr represents a sequence Seq of values,
or entities that are addressed via a relationship with
an arity greater than one.
• The element pexpr is a partial expression that is pa-
rameterized with each item e ∈ Seq. Note that anony-
mous path selectors must be of the same (entity) type
than that of the elements e ∈ Seq.
• Function f ∈ {∀, ∃} indicates the quantifier type that
is used for the expression.
Figure 4 (a) illustrates how an entity may relate to other
entities in horizontal quantifier expressions.
Vertical quantifier expressions. Whereas horizontal
quantifier expressions enable us to reason about relation-
ships of a specific entity, they do not support reasoning
about recursive relationships. Consider rule 9 from Table 1.
This rule cannot be translated in terms of a horizontal quan-
tifier expression. More specifically, its evaluation traverses
the “supervisor” relationship of a physician until (a) a su-
pervisor is found for which the condition is true, or (b) no
more supervisor can be found for the relationship path.
To accommodate this, EBAC supports vertical quanti-
fier expressions (shown in Figure 4 (b)). Vertical quantifier
expressions are evaluated for each entity on a relationship
path that is traversed recursively over an entity type. In the
aforementioned rule, the relationship path is “supervisor”.
Consequently, a condition is evaluated for each physician
found while traversing this relationship.
More formally, we define a vertical quantifier expression
as a tuple (es, P, pexpr, f ∈ {∀ρ, ∃ρ}) in which
• Element es specifies a starting entity selector. Entity
selectors, similar to path selectors, specify a path on
which an entity is addressed. Contrary to path selec-
tors, entity selectors do not address an attribute at the
end of this path, but rather address the entity directly.
• The relationship path P = (p1, p2, ..., pn) a finite, non-
empty, ordered list that specifies the path that must
be traversed at each step in order to parameterize the
partial expression pexpr. The last element pn always
ends at one or more entities of the same type as es.
• A partial expression pexpr that is parameterized with
each entity along the path.
• Function f ∈ {∀ρ,∃ρ}, with ∀ρ the equivalent of uni-
versal quantifier ∀ and ∃ρ the equivalent of ∃.
Optionally, vertical quantifier expressions can be extended
by min,max ∈ N, min < max which indicate the mini-
mal and maximal depth of the path for which the partial
expression must hold.
Consider again the previously mentioned rule concerning
the (in)direct supervisors. This rule contains the following
vertical quantifier expression:
∃ρ,supervisor sv ∈ subject.supervisor :
∃ cons ∈ sv.consultations : (cons.patient ==
object.consultation.patient)
When evaluated, this rule traverses the subject’s supervi-
sor, evaluates the partial expression (starting from the hori-
zontal quantifier expression). If no match is found, the same
partial expression is evaluated for subject.supervisor.super-
visor, and so on. This is repeated this until (a) there is
no more supervisor, (b) the partial expression evaluates to
true, or (c) a previously encountered physician is found.
While the subject.supervisor relationship has an arity of 1,
EBAC also supports relationships with a higher arity. In this
case, each entity from the relationship is used as a parameter
for the partial expression. If no entity is found that leads to
a definite answer for the evaluation, each entity’s children
are evaluated in a breadth-first manner. Next, the processes
is repeated for each element until no new entities can be
found. Duplicate entities are not revisited.
4. THE AUCTORITAS PROTOTYPE
To validate EBAC, we have incepted a practical prototype
called Auctoritas. Auctoritas is an authorization system
that supports EBAC. Auctoritas includes a policy language
and evaluation engine. The prototype is available online2.
The STAPL [15] authorization system served as a basis for
the Auctoritas implementation. STAPL focuses on modular
policy specification, supporting attribute-based policies.
4.1 Policy language
The Auctoritas policy language was incepted as a DSL in
Scala, and has a similar structure to XACML [17]. More
specifically, Auctoritas is also a policy-based language that
supports comparing attributes with each other and concrete
values by means of expressions. Such expressions can be
composed using logical connectives (e.g., and, or, not) and
are evaluated to determine access. Like XACML, Auctoritas
policies are organized in policy trees that use combination
algorithms (e.g., deny overrides) to resolve evaluation con-
flicts. A rule in Auctoritas can either evaluate to permit,
deny or not applicable. However, as opposed to XACML,
Auctoritas is entity-based.
Listing 1 illustrates the translation of all rules from Ta-
ble 1 as rules in a single policy. Each rule can specify a
condition and effect. For example, rule 1 in Listing 1 spec-
ifies a deny decision whenever the subject is a trainee (i.e.,
the value of the trainee attribute is true). Policies can also
specify a target and combination algorithm. For example,
Listing 1 only regards requests to view medical records3. If
this is not the case, the policy is not applicable. Simi-
larly, a rule evaluates to not applicable when its condition
expression evaluates to false.
2http://people.cs.kuleuven.be/~jasper.bogaerts/
auctoritas/
3This is a simplified version of the rules in Table 1. How-
ever, for the evaluation in Section 5, we did specify them in
compliance to Table 1.
Policy("Policy") := when (action.id === "view" & resource.type_ === "MedicalRecord") apply FirstApplicable to (
Rule("rule_1") := deny iff (subject.trainee)
Rule("rule_2") := permit iff (subject.id in object.consultation.patient.consent)
Rule("rule_3") := permit iff (subject.id === object.consultation.physician.supervisor.id)
Rule("rule_4") := permit iff (subject.consultations.exists(
consultation => consultation.patient.id === object.consultation.patient.id &
environment.now <= (consultation.date + 1.years )))
Rule("rule_5") := permit iff (object.consultation.categories.forall(cat => cat in subject.specializations ))
Rule("rule_6") := permit iff (subject.affiliation in object.consultation.patient.enrollments)
Rule("rule_7") := permit iff (object.consultation.physician.affiliation.id === subject.affiliation.id &
(subject.affiliation in object.consultation.patient.enrollments ))
Rule("rule_8") := deny iff (subject.trainee & subject.startDate > (object.consultation.date + 4.years))
Rule("rule_9") := permit iff (subject.supervisor.existsOnPath(supervisor => object.consultation
.patient.consultations.exists(cons => cons.physician.id === supervisor.id)))
)
Listing 1: Translation of all rules in the Auctoritas policy language. Objects are referred to as resources. For brevity, we have
included the rules in a single policy and specified only the view action. However, Auctoritas also supports policy trees.
Auctoritas also supports path selectors to traverse an ar-
bitrary number of relationships. Consider rule 3 in Listing 1.
Starting from an object, this rule traverses the consultation,
physician and supervisor relationships, respectively, to ac-
cess the id attribute. If any of these relationships is not
present, the expression evaluates to false. Note that the
traversed relationship types in this example all have a max-
imum arity of 1. If a path selector contains a relationship
type with a higher maximum arity, more elaborate logical
functions are required.
This is accommodated by quantifier expressions. Consider
rule 4 in Listing 1. This rule is supported by a horizontal
quantifier expression that reasons about every consultation
that corresponds to the subject. The quantifier assesses each
consultation and uses it to parameterize the inner (partial)
expression, which looks up the patient and date correspond-
ing to the consultation. This inner expression is specified
as a lambda function that in practice assesses each identi-
fier corresponding to the relationship it parameterizes. For
example, rule 4 first looks up a list of all identifiers that
correspond to the consultations of the subject, and for each
consultation, looks up further attributes and relationships
that correspond to a consultation by providing the identi-
fier and evaluating the expression. Note that while rule 5
in Listing 1 also uses a horizontal quantifier expression, the
expression only deals with a list of values as opposed to enti-
ties. Consequently, it does not require elaborate evaluation
techniques.
A approach similar to the evaluation of rule 4 is taken to
evaluate vertical quantifier expressions, such as the condi-
tion of rule 9 in Listing 1. This approach requires a minimal
amount of attributes to determine access. Alternatively, pre-
fetching the required attributes for each entity on the path
could reduce the policy evaluation overhead. This is an in-
teresting topic for future research.
In order to specify access control policies, the security ex-
pert first sets up an entity model that describes the concepts
that will be reasoned about in the policy, and maps them to
a database where they are retrieved. Such specification is
based on the application model. Hence, it can be automated.
This constitutes an interesting topic for future work.
4.2 Supporting infrastructure
In [23], Vollbrecht et al. describe a reference architecture
for policy-based authorization systems. This architecture
has been adopted by many authorization systems, among
others XACML [17]. It consists of several components such
as a Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) that enforces an au-
thorization decision, a Policy Decision Point (PDP) that
evaluates access control policies to make a decision and a
Policy Information Point (PIP) that obtains the informa-
tion required to evaluate a policy (e.g., attributes).
Auctoritas also adopts this architecture. More specifically,
it adopts the interfaces of each of the components in order
to retain compatibility. However, Auctoritas also extends
the functionality of the PDP and PIP in order to cope with
the differences between EBAC and other models. Such an
extension can introduce latency overhead during policy eval-
uation. This is evaluated in Section 5.
The PDP is extended to support relationships. This also
includes elaborate evaluation logic for horizontal and ver-
tical quantifier expressions. The PIP is extended to han-
dle path selectors and requests for attributes parameter-
ized in anonymous path selectors. It obtains the value(s)
for the attribute, addressed by a path selector, by auto-
matically constructing a query that traverses the path by
means of join operations. For example, the PIP handles
“object.consultation.patient.id” by composing a query that
joins the medical record, consultation and patient together
based on their relating attributes. The id attribute is se-
lected from this join query.
5. EVALUATION
Section 4 demonstrated the applicability of EBAC and
introduced Auctoritas. This section evaluates both the ex-
pressiveness and policy evaluation performance overhead of
Auctoritas with regard to XACML.
5.1 Expressiveness
In order to compare the expressiveness of ABAC and EBAC,
we have translated the rules that were introduced in the il-
lustrative example of Section 2 into XACML and Auctoritas.
For Auctoritas, this was illustrated previously in Listing 1.
Table 2 provides a comparison of expressiveness of XACML
and Auctoritas with regard to the rules that were specified
in the illustrative example. Table 2 indicates categories of
expressions that can be specified in Auctoritas, respectively
XACML, with a X if this does not involve changing the
PIP (e.g., by providing custom queries or access logic on the
returned attributes). Expression categories that cannot be
expressed in this way are indicated with a ×. We assume
Category XACML Auctoritas Rules
Regular attribute comparisons X X 1
Composed relationships × X 2, 3, 6, 7, 8
Simple horizontal quantification X X 5
Relationship horizontal quantification × X 4
Vertical quantification × X 9
Table 2: Comparison of expressiveness of XACML and Auctoritas with regard to the rules specified in Section 2. XACML
supports the first and third category, and as a result, can express rules 1 and 4 from the illustrative example. Auctoritas
supports all categories of expressions. Hence, Auctoritas can express all rules from the illustrative example without additional
configuration of the PIP. A translation of all rules to Auctoritas is illustrated in Listing 1.
the underlying data model for the attributes to coincide with
the entity model that was presented in Figure 2.
Note that all presented rules can be specified in XACML.
However, as indicated earlier, complex rules, particularly in-
volving relationships, require additional implementation in
the PIP. This decreases readability of the policy. Moreover,
it may require both the attribute and query to be reconfig-
ured whenever a rule is modified. Rule modification may
even require recompilation and redeployment of the PIP.
The first row of Table 2 categorizes the expressions that
can be described using regular attribute comparisons. For
example, the rule“A trainee physician can not create medical
records” contains a condition that only addresses attributes
of a subject, object, and action directly. This expression
category is supported by both XACML and Auctoritas.
However, as XACML cannot examine relationships di-
rectly, the expression category concerning composed rela-
tionships is not supported. This category comprises com-
parisons that use path selectors which follow relationships to
address attributes. For example, path selector “object.con-
sultation.physician.trainee” traverses two relationships be-
fore addressing an attribute. Such path selectors generally
involve various look-ups which, for XACML, requires join
statements in the underlying customized query for attributes
maintained in a database. Therefore, as opposed to Auctori-
tas, XACML requires PIP changes to support this.
Similar to XACML, Auctoritas supports simple quantifi-
cations. This category involves horizontal quantifier expres-
sions that only compare an attribute to all elements of a se-
quence, or compare all elements of two sequences with each
other. For example, an expression may evaluate whether a
value is greater than each element in a sequence. XACML
provides functions such as any-of, all-of and any-of-any
to accommodate such expressions. However, XACML does
not support expressions such as “A physician can view med-
ical records of patients who had a consultation with him/her
in the last year”. This rule involves two separate expressions:
(a) patients should have had a consultation with the physi-
cian; and (b) that consultation should have occurred in the
last year. These expressions must have a correlating entity
(i.e., the consultation), and therefore, cannot be evaluated
separately. Hence, such rules cannot be specified in XACML
without implementing specialized queries at the PIP.
Lastly, XACML does not support vertically quantified ex-
pressions on relationships. For instance, the rule “A physi-
cian can view a medical record if the patient of its corre-
sponding consultation has previously had a consultation with
the acting physician’s (in)direct supervisor” (rule 9) requires
a recursion over all supervisor relationships that start from
the subject. In order to support this, XACML requires the
PIP to accommodate a method that performs this recursion
to generate the data set on which the rule can be evaluated.
Consequently, this also requires customization at the PIP in
order to support translation in XACML.
5.2 Evaluation of performance overhead
Complex evaluation over relationships requires additional
evaluation logic in both PIP and PDP components of the
evaluation engine. This introduces policy evaluation over-
head. In order to measure the overhead induced by the
evaluation, we analyze the performance and compare it to
XACML. Our analysis is based on the translation of the rules
from Table 1. When the rules were not directly supported in
XACML, we configured the XACML PIP to perform queries
to enable the translation of the rule. For example, a path
selector “object.consultation.patient.id” in Auctoritas is rep-
resented as an attribute “object.consultation patient id” in
XACML. Note that this can lead to problems, as was indi-
cated earlier in this paper.
Setup. Each rule was organized in a separate policy for
which the evaluation times were measured for both lan-
guages. We did not measure the evaluation overhead of
policies with multiple rules, nor did we take into account
the parsing overhead of the policies (a known problem for
XACML [21]). Rather, we focused on the overhead intro-
duced by attribute look-ups and expression evaluation. Both
PIPs used JPA4 to communicate with the database contain-
ing the attributes. We disabled all data caching for both
PIPs. Requests to the PIPs occurred using local TCP re-
quests via Apache Thrift5. We used the SunXACML imple-
mentation6 for the XACML evaluation engine. The evalua-
tion was performed on a Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-3340M CPU
@ 2.70GHz with 8GB RAM running Fedora 20. Each rule
was evaluated for 100000 applicable requests (i.e., the target
matched, and as a result, attributes needed to be fetched).
The results omit the 2.5% minimal and maximal outliers.
Results. Figure 5 illustrates the results of the evaluation.
This figure shows that for most rules, Auctoritas performs
significantly better than XACML.
For regular attribute comparison rules, the mean differ-
ence is 0.4ms in favor of Auctoritas. The simplified structure
of Auctoritas as compared to the SunXACML implementa-
tion reduces its evaluation times.
In addition, composed relationships (i.e., rules 2, 3, 6, 7
4See http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/java/javaee/
tech/persistence-jsp-140049.html
5Available at https://thrift.apache.org/
6Available at http://sunxacml.sourceforge.net/
Figure 5: Evaluation overhead comparison between XACML
and Auctoritas. EBAC evaluation performs slightly better.
Rules 4 and 9 introduce overhead due to the number of sep-
arate attribute look-ups required to evaluate the rules.
and 8) evaluate significantly faster than the XACML imple-
mentation. This indicates that the number of relationships
on a path does not have a great influence on the evalua-
tion time. For instance, rule 7 has eight relationships that
are traversed, but does not involve significant overhead com-
pared to rule 3, which requires only three relationship traver-
sals. Auctoritas automatically generates queries to accom-
modate relationship traversals via joins. This reduces the
evaluation time (e.g., separately looking up each entity on a
path for rule 3 resulted in a mean evaluation time of 1.58ms
compared to 0.3ms).
However, Figure 5 also shows that rules 4 and 9 perform
better in XACML. These reflect the relationship horizontal
quantification and vertical quantification expressions, and
their evaluation introduces a larger overhead. For the hori-
zontal quantification (i.e., rule 4), the overhead as compared
to XACML is 5.4ms per request. In the prototype imple-
mentation, each parameterization of the expression involves
a separate look-up for each entity. This introduces signifi-
cant overhead compared to a query that filters out attribute
values of entities that do not need to be evaluated, as in
our XACML translation. Note that the evaluated rule is
inherently an expensive operation that may involve many
consultation entities7. Evidently, the evaluation time will
rise with larger data sets, and therefore such rules must be
cautiously specified. The optimization for this is an inter-
esting topic for future work, and may involve performing
queries to the PIP that retrieve the attribute values for each
of the entities that will be parameterized in a single request.
A similar issue occurs for vertical quantification (rule 9),
where there is an overhead of 1.7ms compared to XACML.
Optimization for this may involve additional logic to be
added to the PIP to cope with the number of look-ups.
Discussion. Although Auctoritas does introduce over-
head for complex rules compared to XACML, it does not
require security experts to implement any queries or spe-
cialized lookup methods at the PIP. Such implementation
could be considered a more expensive operation, as it may
introduce errors. Moreover, it could require considerable ef-
fort for the security expert to implement such queries. To
realize the translation in XACML, we have specified a total
of eighteen queries (twelve of which required at least some
form of table joining and filtering logic to be performed in
7In this evaluation, the mean size of the operative data set
was 23 consultations.
the database) and one method (to realize the vertical quan-
tification). For large policies, such configuration effort is
likely to grow. Auctoritas provides a technology to reduce
this effort while reasoning about the application domain.
6. RELATEDWORK
Over the last decade, various models have been proposed
to mitigate issues of RBAC [8]. In this regard, this work
is primarily influenced by Attribute-Based Access Control
(ABAC) and Relationship-Based Access Control (ReBAC).
ABAC [13, 24] introduced the use of attributes in order
to determine whether access is permitted. While this sup-
ports expressive policies, it does not allow specification of
complex relationships. One important supporting technol-
ogy is XACML [17]. XACML introduces an attribute-based
policy language that also supports policy trees and obliga-
tions. These aspects have drawn a lot of interest (among
others, [16, 18]). However, these works mostly focus on for-
malization or analysis of combination algorithms. Our work
focuses on the expressiveness of attribute-based policies in
XACML, as compared to Auctoritas.
Relationship-Based Access Control (ReBAC, [4, 9]) takes
into account relationships in order to make access control de-
cisions. This supports the expression of a great deal of rules.
ReBAC has typically been applied to social networks [2, 12,
14]. However, Crampton et al. [4] introduced a work in
which they (a) argue a wider applicability of relationships
than only social networks, and (b) consider entities other
than users to be relevant in specifying relationships.
Carminati et al. [2] analyzed the requirements with regard
to access control for social networks and introduced a model
which constrained access based on the type, depth and trust
level of relationships and provided client-side enforcement
of access control according to a rule-based approach. This
work takes into account depth and type of relationships to
determine access, which is also adopted in our work.
Giunchiglia et al. proposed RelBAC [10], a model that
is similar to ReBAC. Like our work, the authors associate
RelBAC to the Entity-Relationship model [3].
In [9], Fong identifies, among others, the concept of com-
posable relations as a building block to build complex re-
lationships based on more primitive relationships. This is
related to our concept of vertical quantifier expressions.
While ReBAC is an interesting access control model that
has influenced this work, a general issue for ReBAC is that
it does not directly support comparisons of properties of the
involved entities. As a consequence, it does not always map
seamlessly onto the application domain.
Ribeiro et al. introduced the SPL policy language [19],
which supports entities and their relations, comparison of
properties and quantifiers. Ruby CanCan [1] is a policy lan-
guage that has a lot of similarities with SPL. Among others,
it also supports addressing of entities and attribute com-
parisons and is integrated seamlessly with the application
model. Hachem et al. [11] introduced a policy framework
for controlling access in mobile applications. This work fea-
tured, among others, a policy language which supported ex-
pressive policies. While these policy languages support rea-
soning about entities and relationships in a natural way, they
do not support vertical quantifier expressions, and hence, do
not entirely support EBAC. Moreover, they do not support
policies to be organized in trees.
Also relevant is the work of Verhanneman et al. [22]. Ver-
hanneman et al. enforce separation of concerns by support-
ing organization-wide policies for which the rules are en-
forced in an aspect-oriented framework. This enables the
security expert to reason about application-specific concepts
using Java code. However, changing such a policy requires
recompiling the application code. Separation of concerns
was also addressed by De Win et al. [5], which motivated
the use of aspect-oriented programming to enforce it.
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented Entity-Based Access Con-
trol (EBAC), an access control model that supports both
comparison of attribute values, as well as traversing relation-
ships of arbitrary entities. EBAC maps onto the application
domain in a expressive way because its underlying ER-model
can be applied to most application models. We have pro-
posed a model and validated that it is feasible to support
EBAC by means of the Auctoritas policy language. The
evaluation of Auctoritas indicates that (a) it supports rela-
tionships in a more expressive way than XACML and (b) that
it introduces only limited performance overhead for policy
evaluation. Support for these expressions involves no cus-
tom query specifications and hence reduce the management
effort involved when such rules must be supported. Con-
sequently, we are convinced that EBAC offers a promising
new approach for access control.
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